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FOREWORD
A year ago the Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the Army
After Next Project (AANP) as a means of stimulating constructive
thinking about the Army's future throughout the service. AANP has
quickly developed into a primary vehicle for long-range planning.
Under the leadership of the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), the AANP has conducted an ambitious program of studies,
symposia and workshops, culminating in a Winter War Game and
Senior Seminar held at Carlisle, January 27-February 6, 1997.
In addition to supporting TRADOC's AANP through the world
class simulation and gaming facilities of the Center for
Strategic Leadership, the Army War College has begun a
complementary research project, combining the talents of faculty
and students. A key line of initial inquiry for us has been to
forecast the nature of the future security environment in which
the Army will operate.
That is the task Dr. Steven Metz set for himself in this
monograph. In the pages that follow he propounds "currents of
change" that will determine the future and sketches a series of
plausible future security systems. Each system is characterized
by the forms of conflict that will dominate it, the major
strategic issues the United States might face, and the resulting
military implications. While Dr. Metz's analysis leads to
observations certain to be controversial, he illustrates quite
clearly the primacy that environmental context will have in
shaping our national security outlook and military strategy.
Thus, Dr. Metz's observations on trends and systems warrant
careful consideration as national policymakers and the Army's
leaders build the military force of the future.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study as the fourth in its series of Army After Next
publications.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
It is important to analyze long-term changes in the global
security environment in order to begin preparation for the postForce XXI U.S. Army. Existing currents of change suggest a number
of feasible yet very different future security environments as
defined by the primary source and form of violence conflict. Each
would require a different type of U.S. Army.
Part I: Currents of Change. The most important overarching
currents of change which will shape the future security
environment include:
• Interconnectedness" which is the increasing electronic and
physical linking of individuals, groups, commercial entities, and
organizations of all sorts;
• The compression of time; and,
• "Demassification" which is the replacement of very large
commercial and political entities with smaller, more flexible
ones.
In the realm of technology, the information revolution will
continue and blend with ongoing changes in engineering to allow a
range of "brilliant" machines and various types of
nanotechnology. Eventually the information revolution will meld
with a nascent biological revolution growing from genetic
engineering.
For the future security environment, the most important economic
currents of change are:
• The continued transnationalization of corporations and
markets;
• The emergence and consolidation of post-industrial,
knowledge-based economies;
• The geographic shift of industry;
• The transformation of corporations from hierarchies to
networks; and,
• The outright collapse of formal economies in parts of the
world.
Important political currents of change include:

v

• The devolution of power from sovereign nation-states;
• Changes in the nature of security; and,
• A decline in the legitimacy of states.
The most salient social and demographic currents of change are:
• Continued population growth and urbanization;
• Continue escalation of crime; and,
• The emergence of economically superfluous segments of
state populations.
The ethical and psychological currents shaping the future
security environment include:
• An intensified search for new frameworks of personal
identity; and,
• Increased resistance to rapid and radical change.
The most important military currents of change are:
• Increased heterogeneity among global armed forces; and,
• A redefinition of civil-military relations.
Part II: Alternative Futures. There are five forms that the
security environment of the year 2030 and beyond might take. Each
would require a radically different U.S. military.

A state-based, balance-of-power system is one in which
sovereign nation-states seek their national interests, sometimes
using traditional forms of military force. State-on-state war
remains the most significant form of armed conflict. In such a
system, shifting coalitions maintain the balance and serve as
counterweights to powerful states. As the most powerful state,
the United States is likely to see coalitions designed to
constrain it. For the U.S. military, warfighting would remain the
primary mission. Both unilateral and coalition capabilities would
be necessary. The United States could face a peer competitor, but
this would more likely be a coalition rather than a single state.
Many other opponents would use asymmetric counters to American
military strength.
A trisected global security system is the most likely one.
In this, the world would be divided into three tiers. The First
Tier would be composed of advanced, stable regions and states
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with information-based economies. There would be significant
political, economic, cultural, and military integration within
the First Tier. First Tier states would not wage traditional war
against each other. The Second Tier would consist of a range of
diverse and autonomous nation-states, most with industrial-based
economies. These states would retain traditional military forces,
and would occasionally wage war on each other. Most Second Tier
states would acquire weapons of mass destruction. The Third Tier
would be characterized by endemic violence, ungovernability, and
a range of ecological problems. Armed forces would take the form
of militias, warlord armies, and terrorist gangs. Third Tier
states would not have the capability to wage sustained, largescale warfare. The U.S. military would need very different
capabilities in each tier, so the grand strategy framed by
American policymakers would determine the shape of the armed
forces. While the U.S. military would use traditional force
against Second and Third Tier enemies, it would seldom if ever
wage sustained campaigns.

An ideology-based system is one in which conflict arises
from the reemergence of transnational ideologies and mass belief
systems. Most conflict would occur along the fault lines between
ideological blocs, and the use of force would be only partially
contained by normative restraints. This means that wars can
easily escalate, even to the point of full-scale world war
between hostile ideological blocs. The U.S. military would be
larger and more robust in an ideology-based system than in the
other feasible alternatives. Power projection and support to
allies would remain key components.
In a security system characterized by internal collapse,
internal violence rather than state-on-state war poses the
greatest problems. Many weak states will fragment or collapse,
and even strong, developed states will face internal violence,
often provoking draconian responses. The U.S. military will not
be configured for conventional warfighting, but will focus on the
sorts of functions handled today by Special Forces, such as raids
and support to allies.
Finally, a system dominated by economic warfare would see
the intense, sometimes violent struggle for resources and markets
cause armed conflict. Transnational entities would develop their
own security interests separate from states. Intelligence
gathering and security would undergo privatization, with powerful
transnational security firms performing functions that state
militaries cannot or will not. In the use of force, though, there
would be pressure to minimize collateral damage and civilian
casualties. In such a system, the U.S. military would need only a
very limited capacity for traditional warfighting and would,
instead, focus on information warfare. Nonlethal weapons of all
kinds would be particularly significant.
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Conclusions. It is not yet clear which of the alternative
future security systems will actually come to pass. In any of
them, though, factors such as non-state enemies and weapons of
mass destruction are likely to be important. At this point, all
the U.S. military can do is continue to debate and analyze the
implications of each so that it is prepared once the future
system does begin to take shape.
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STRATEGIC HORIZONS:
THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
Introduction.
As a new millennium approaches, the world is poised at the
confluence of two great forces. One is the revolutionary
transformation of the global security environment as the Cold War
system transmutates into something else. The second is a
compression of time, a quickening of the pace of change so
extreme that it, too, must be considered revolutionary. Of all
the effects these two forces will have, one is particularly
relevant for political leaders, national security professionals,
and military planners: strategy, with its drive to synchronize
diverse efforts and shape the long-term future, will be more
significant than ever before in human history.
Yet, however important it is for those shaping national
security to peer into the future, this is never easy. Futurism is
a complex endeavor demanding creativity, imagination, and a
willingness to take intellectual risks. At the same time, it is
vital. Because changing or adapting a military takes so long and
because the price of failing to do so in the right way and at the
right time is so high, security professionals and military
planners absolutely must grapple with the long-term future. To do
so demands a rigorous methodology built on heuristic devices. One
useful approach, pioneered by Charles W. Taylor and others,
stresses trends. The futurist selects relevant strategic trends,
projects the consequences, outcomes, interactions, and
probabilities of these trends and derives plausible alternatives
from them.1 During this process, the strategic futurist must
remain sensitive to subtle, indirect, and often unexpected
relationships both outside and inside the realm of national
security. This methodology can be used to generate an array of
alternative future security systems, each distinguished primarily
by the source and form of armed conflict.2
For the U.S. Army, such analysis is well worth the effort.
Since a land force configured to deal with one sort of future
security system might be ineffective in another, construction of
the Army that will take shape after Force XXI is fielded depends
heavily on futurism. By exploring the implications of alternative
future security environments now, the Army can offer the best
possible advice to civilian decisionmakers plotting the nation's
future, provide usable estimates of the military force structures
and risks associated with a variety of alternative future
security systems, and lay the foundation for rapid institutional
adaptation as the contours of the future security system become
clearer. Even though the precise form of the future security
environment cannot be predicted with certainty, feasible
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alternatives and guideposts can and should be developed now. This
study is intended to lay a foundation for such thinking.
PART I: CURRENTS OF CHANGE
Overarching Currents.
In a time of intense and far-reaching change, the metaphoric
term "currents" may best capture the force of change driving
nearly all aspects of human life. Currents of change are like
oceanic ones. Not all are of equal power and importance as they
swirl and intermix. Some fade for a while, only to reemerge far
away. And, just as there are warm and cold oceanic currents,
currents of change can be positive, negative, or a combination of
the two. The relationships between currents of change are
exceedingly complex, but to make sound judgements about the
future requires understanding them.
Three overarching currents are particularly important in
shaping the future security environment. The first is what can be
called "interconnectedness"--the increasing electronic and
physical linking of individuals, groups, commercial entities, and
organizations of all sorts.3 In coming decades, this will
probably accelerate as cultures converge and sometimes merge
while a wide range of communities develop tighter economic and
political links. Interconnectedness reflects the tremendous
improvements made in the technology of communications and
transportation as well as equally vast increases in the
affordability of the long-distance transfer of information and
the movement of people and goods. At its extreme,
interconnectedness leads to economic interdependence, political
unity, and cultural homogenization. Even when it does not go this
far, interconnectedness already affects nearly all aspects of
life in most societies and is likely to do so to an even greater
extent in the future.
A second overarching current is the compression of time. In
the economic, political, and social realms, the decision-action
cycle--the collection and assessment of information, analysis,
decisionmaking, the implementation of decision outcomes, and
adjustment--is accelerating. As a result, the life span of ideas,
concepts, procedures, and organizations is declining. For success
in nearly any endeavor, creativity and innovation must be
continuous rather than episodic. This will play a major role in
shaping the future security environment, in part because it
brings immense, sometimes unbearable pressure on governments. As
Alvin Toffler writes, "The acceleration of change has overpowered
the decisional capacity of our institutions, making today's
political structures obsolete, regardless of party ideology or
leadership."4
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A third overarching current is "demassification."5 It
represents a reversal of the centuries-long trend toward the
concentration of production and power which led to things like
the "mass media," gave larger industries and corporations a
competitive advantage over smaller ones, and gave large political
entities an advantage over smaller ones. Today, technology and
human factors are leading toward fragmentation of industrial
megaliths and allowing "niche" companies and organizations to
compete with and sometimes surpass larger ones. The same
phenomenon may soon appear in the realm of politics. At the same
time, personal identity is demassifying as mass, "one size fits
all" belief systems no longer seem to meet the psychological
needs of modern citizens with access to electronic media and
computer-based networked communications. For the first time in
history, individuals have the power to create, craft, and
customize a belief system rather than being forced to adapt to
existing ones. The implications of this are immense and include
things like the erosion of the power of leadership in societies
where individualized belief systems become the norm. Taken to its
ultimate, this might cause humans to totally redefine the meaning
of basic social units like community and society.
Technological Currents.
Within the parameters of these macro-level currents, a
number of other changes are likely to shape the future security
environment. Some of the most important are technological. Large
parts of the world are in the midst of what appears to be
permanent and intense technological change as new machines, new
systems and, more importantly, new uses for new machines appear
at a breathtaking pace. Technology can augment both political
stability and instability. On the positive side, nonlethal
weapons can limit the blood cost of conflict resolution and
provide governments innovative ways to meet citizen needs and
demands.6 On the negative side, technology can create new
vulnerabilities by allowing attacks on national and transnational
information systems.7 Technology also allows organizations and
individuals using violence to communicate and cooperate, and can
amplify discontent. Technological change can also shape the
global security system by exacerbating the difference between
"haves" and "have nots," whether individuals or states. This can
generate resentment, hostility and, potentially, conflict as
technology serves as a visible reminder of stratification and
unsettling psycho-social change. In the early 19th century,
England was swept by a violent movement known as the "Luddites."
These handicraftsmen sought, among other things, to destroy the
textile machinery that was replacing them. Today, rapid change is
already spawning neo-Luddites, like the "Unabomber," who see
technology as dangerous or a challenge to human dignity or
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quality of life and who are increasingly willing to use violence
to oppose the change associated with technology. While the
Unabomber's claim to represent an organized movement appears to
be pure fantasy, the rise of such a movement is certainly
possible and may even be likely.
In the past, new technology tended to emerge at a pace which
allowed the maturation of the technology itself and for social,
political, economic, and ethical adaptation to it. Today, the
compression of time and the quantum increase in global
communication mean that technology is often superseded even
before it matures or society fully adapts to it. For instance,
today electronic information technology built around the silicon
microchip plays a large role in driving social, political,
economic, and ethical change. It is becoming a major source of
wealth and power, a means of stratification both within and
between societies, and, increasingly, a seamless part of social,
economic, and political life rather than a "stand alone"
mechanism used only by specialists. This is a sign of the ongoing
social maturation of information technology. But even though the
end of the information revolution is not yet in sight, it is
already possible to speculate on what will supersede it. First
will come a blending of the information revolution with ongoing
changes in engineering and manufacturing leading to dramatically
improved robotics, "brilliant" machines capable of complex
decisionmaking, and nanotechnology in which the ability to
manipulate and manufacture individual molecules allows the
construction of tiny but complex machines. Eventually this may
fuse with a concomitant biological revolution arising from the
science of genetic engineering leading to manufactured entities
that are part machine, part living organism. Cyborgs--once
relegated to science fiction--are now conceivable. A
biotechnological revolution of this form will have immense
political, social, and ethical implications and could
dramatically shake the foundation of human beliefs and
perceptions.
Given the complexity, expense, and massive potential of the
machines that might emerge from a fusion of the information,
mechanical, and biological revolutions, it is possible that one
of the great political issues of the latter half of the 21st
century will pit those who oppose the construction of such
machines on moral grounds against those who advocate them. The
result may be violent conflict. The fusion of the information,
mechanical, and biological revolutions will eventually change the
way military power is applied as well. Close engagements
involving human soldiers may become a historic anachronism
superseded by combat between robots or cyborgs. Such a situation
will, of course, only come to pass after the careers and even the
lives of today's political and military decisionmakers. But, it
is equally true that directions set by contemporary
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decisionmakers, especially those concerning the human dimensions
of technology, its social functions, and ethical constraints,
will shape the future.
Economic Currents.
Many futurists subscribe to Karl Marx's notion that
economics drive all other currents of change. While this may be
an oversimplification, the central role of economics must not be
underestimated. For those concerned with national security, the
most important economic currents are: (1) the continued
transnationalization of corporations and markets; (2) the
emergence and consolidation of post-industrial, knowledge-based
economies (or, at least, economies built on information sectors);
(3) the shift of industry to new geographic regions, particularly
the Pacific rim; (4) corporate restructuring from hierarchies to
networks; (5) demassification and the emergence of niche markets
and firms; and, (6) the outright collapse of formal economies in
some parts of the world.
In the coming decades, the ability of governments to control
commercial firms or use the economic element of national power
will continue to erode. When governments attempt to use or
tightly control commercial firms, businesses will simply move
elsewhere. The near future may even see a reemergence of the
struggle for power between states and commercial organizations
that subsided during the past hundred years as states gained the
advantage. Economic changes also have a "bottom up" effect on the
global security environment. A large proportion of the world's
population is attempting to adapt to economic change or economicdriven social change. In any social, political, or economic shift
of revolutionary proportions, there are losers who resist the
process. Given this, those unable to adapt to the economic
changes taking place or in danger of being left behind may resist
violently. In the regions of the world where formal economies
collapse, states themselves will disintegrate or become impotent,
thus spawning endemic violence. This is already underway in much
of Sub-Saharan Africa including Somalia, parts of Zaire, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone, as well as parts of Asia such as Afghanistan.
It may spread in coming decades.
Political Currents.
At least three political currents are likely to shape the
future security environment. One is the devolution of power from
sovereign nation-states. Even though there is a resurgence of
nationalism in the former Soviet bloc, the ability of the
sovereign nation-state to adequately meet the needs of its
citizens is eroding. As Jessica T. Mathews puts it, "The steady
concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648
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with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while."8 In
the 20th century, the first great blow to the sovereign nationstate came from the two world wars. Sovereignty implied the right
to go to war in pursuit of national interests when a minimal set
of conditions was fulfilled. The horror of the world wars showed
that technology and industrialization made this notion too
expensive, at least for the world's most powerful states. World
War II and, in particular, the Holocaust, further eroded
sovereignty by giving birth to the idea that actions defined as
breaches of human rights by the world community, even if
acceptable under the laws of a sovereign state (e.g., apartheid
in white-ruled South Africa and Saddam Hussein's treatment of
Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities), pose a threat to
international peace and stability and thus justify outside
intervention. As increased interstate trade and the rise of
multinational corporations led to the internationalization of the
global economy, the sovereign nation-state suffered another blow
as its ability to control its own economic well-being declined.
As a result, the utility of the economic element of national
power declined.
The devolution of power from sovereign nation-states will
probably continue in coming decades. In part, this is due to
cultural convergence, particularly among global elites linked by
information technology and the entertainment industry. Signs of
this include the globalization of Western and particularly
American popular culture, and the spread of liberal democracy. If
anything, information technology will accelerate this process as
the Internet becomes more economically, politically, and
culturally important. Through "chat rooms" and virtual
conferencing, the Internet facilitates the growth of
transnational electronic societies and the spread of the English
language. Admittedly, cultural convergence among the world's
technological, political, and economic elites will not
automatically lead to the demise of the sovereign nation-states.
Western Europe, the Arab world, and many other state systems have
seen periods where elites shared a transnational culture (often
based on religion) while independent states remained preeminent.
Cultural convergence among global elites will, however, affect
the security environment in yet unknown ways and might, in
combination with other factors, pave the way for the obsolescence
of the sovereign national state.
The changing nature of security or, more accurately, changes
in the nature of threats to personal security also encourage the
devolution of power from nation-states. As Martin van Creveld has
pointed out, the modern nation- state arose in large part because
it was the most effective unit for making war on other sovereign
nation-states.9 Sovereign nation-states have not yet proven that
they are equally adept at dealing with new threats to personal
security, especially transnational, sub-state criminal cartels in
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coalition with a range of indigenous social castoffs. If what
Jessica Mathews calls "a growing sense that the individuals'
security may not in fact reliably derive from their nation's
security" continues, the nation-states will have taken another
step toward obsolescence.10 Some states are already exploring the
privatization of intelligence, which is a key component of
security.11 If nation-states also begin to privatize the military
component of security, it will be their death-knell. Many state
governments, though, will not "go gentle into that good night" of
obsolescence and will resist the loss of power. The result will
be conflict and violence.
The demassification of security may spill over into other
areas as well. The information revolution already provides local
communities the opportunity to assume many of the infrastructure,
development, and welfare functions previously performed by
national governments. To date, there is no political incentive or
will to shift economic and military power from central
governments to local ones, but this could change. If national
governments continue to lose functions, they will soon lose
power. At the same time, sovereign nation-states are unable to
deal with many transnational problems, especially those
concerning the ecology and health. The shift in these areas is
toward empowerment of transnational entities. Again, as
transnational entities assume greater responsibility, they will
eventually develop their own financial base and further the
assault on the sovereign nation-state from both above and below.
The modern nation-state became the dominant political
organization because it was effective at providing order,
stability, and social identity. Unlike the world's principalities, city-states, sultanates, sheikdoms, chieftaincies, and
other small political units, the nation-state was large enough to
defend itself but not so large as to be culturally meaningless or
conflictive like multiethnic empires. To a large extent, the
original raison d'etre of the sovereign nation-state was to make
war. Initially most war was waged against internal forces-usually landed nobility or minority groups--resisting the
centralization of power in the hands of the nation-state. As
nation-states consolidated and centralized internal authority,
interstate warmaking became the "core competency" of the
sovereign nation-state. What gave the sovereign nation-state its
amazing longevity was its combination of cultural coherence (at
least those states with a dominant culture) and its ability to
assume new tasks. The latter is particularly important.
Over the centuries, the state went from being solely a
provider of order and stability to the source of a vast range of
services such as infrastructure construction, health, education,
environmental protection, and support to the arts. Today, the
sovereign nation-state may have overstepped its capabilities and
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assumed so many tasks that it is in danger of losing its
coherence and even its legitimacy. Individuals consider the state
responsible for jobs, health care, and old age pensions that
previously were the purview of the family. Today even effective
nation-states are hard pressed to meet the demands placed on
them. As people increasingly turn to other sources for resources
like security and health care, the power and legitimacy of the
nation-state will erode further. As Jessica T. Mathews writes:
Nation-states may simply no longer be the natural
problem-solving unit. Local government addresses
citizens' growing desire for a role in decision-making,
while transnational, regional, and even global entities
better fit the dimensions of trends in economics,
resources, and security.12
Skepticism concerning the effectiveness of the state and of
political leaders is being exacerbated by other factors as well.
One is the spread of the American variant of liberalism. The
American political culture has always combined a grudging and
utilitarian respect for political authority with a healthy
distrust of politicians and the political style of
decisionmaking. When American liberalism is transplanted to other
cultures, this distrust often spawns debilitating pessimism and
anomie. Extensive state involvement in the management of the
economy--a characteristic of the 20th century--opens opportunity
for corruption by political leaders. When this occurs, legitimacy
is further weakened. In addition, technology developed by the
entertainment industry may inadvertently erode political
legitimacy and authority by blurring the distinction between
illusion and reality. Generations growing up around the world are
so accustomed to special effects that they increasingly question
much of what they see or hear. The refinement of virtual reality,
morphing (the creation and manipulation of realistic electronic
images of someone), and holograms will add to this blurring of
illusion and reality. Since trust is the foundation of political
legitimacy, this pervasive skepticism, mistrust, and disbelief
are likely to add to the disintegration of political authority.
Social and Demographic Currents.
Of the ongoing social and demographic currents, population
growth and urbanization are likely to have the greatest impact on
the security environment. While population has leveled off in the
developed world, policies designed to stem population growth will
not take effect in the developing world for at least 30 years.13
According to most demographic predictions, world population will
eventually stabilize between 10 and 11 billion (about twice the
current population).14 Population growth alone does not
automatically hinder economic growth or cause poverty.15 There is,
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however, a complex relationship among population growth,
environmental decay, particularly in developing areas unable or
unwilling to implement sound ecological practices, and migration,
whether to urban areas within developing countries or to
developed countries.16 Population pressure can accelerate
environmental decay and, under some circumstances, spark or
exacerbate conflict.17 The relationship between population growth
and conflict is thus indirect, but nonetheless important. As
Robert Kaplan puts it, "Demographic pressures never reveal
themselves as such: People don't demonstrate in the streets or
attack others because they believe their region is overcrowded.
The crush of humanity invites scarcity, whether in food, water,
housing, or jobs. Scarcity fuels discontent . . ."18
Urbanization is also changing the global security
environment. The United Nations believes that by 2005, half of
the world's population will live in cities.19 The trend toward
urbanization will be most intense in the developing world.
According to some estimates, Africa will have gone from 14.5
percent urban in 1950 to 53.9 percent in 2010, South America from
43.2 percent to 90 percent over the same period, and Asia from
16.4 percent to 50.1 percent.20 The population of megalopoli like
Mexico City and Sao Paulo will be well over 20 million by the end
of the 20th century and, according to U.N. projections, there
will be 24 urban agglomerations with more than 10 million
inhabitants.21 Places like contemporary Kinshasa, Zaire, where
there is a total collapse of government authority and
infrastructure in the slum regions, may portend the future of
many urban areas.22 As with population growth, there is no direct,
linear relationship between urbanization and violence, but when
urbanization is combined with other factors like the declining
legitimacy and effectiveness of the state and economic problems,
the result is incendiary. Given this, Ralph Peters is probably
correct when he writes, "The future of warfare lies in the
streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the
sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken
cities of our world."23
In most of the world, crime has replaced state-on-state war
or organized political insurgency as the preeminent security
threat. In large cities and Third World areas where states have
collapsed or failed, violence has become omnipresent, a normal
part of daily life rather than an aberration. Nothing suggests
that this will be reversed in the near future. Technology and the
overall drive for efficiency in business is increasing the number
of "economically surplus" people. Where a century ago it took the
labor of nearly the entire population of a state to produce the
various goods needed to sustain a society, the world is moving
toward a time when high rates of production will require the
labor of only a small group (whether physical or mental labor).
The social and ethical issues arising from this will pose great
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challenges in the 21st century. The traditional notion that links
self-esteem and status to employment and productivity--what
sociologist Max Weber called the "Protestant ethic"--may become
obsolete. Such tectonic shifts in attitudes and social structures
are always dangerous.
Initially, the economic superfluity of large segments of the
population will lead to pervasive un- and under- employment along
with the boredom and low self-esteem which breed of crime and
violence. Global intercon- nectedness, whether electronic or
physical as migration becomes easier and more frequent, will
allow transnational criminal syndicates to coalesce, form
alliances, and, sometimes, go to war with each other to the
detriment of bystanders. In many cases, the response will be a
militarization or re-militarization of state and society as
citizens lose confidence in the ability of civilian regimes to
preserve law and order and turn to armed forces--whether state
militaries or private ones--to "save" society. Eventually, it may
require a new ethic that accords status on some basis other than
formal employment to regain social stability.
Ethical and Psychological Currents.
Changes in values and attitudes are particularly difficult
to predict yet will be important determinants of where, when, and
how armed force is used in the future security environment. Two
ethical and psychological currents of change appear particularly
significant. One is the worldwide quest for personal identity and
social meaning in the face of wide-ranging and rapid change. In
the Third World, traditional systems of identity and meaning are
in their death throes as urbanization increasingly leaves rural
villages--the historic structure for identity and meaning-depopulated or inhabited only by the very young and the very old,
or marginalizes their role in shaping social life. The sprawling
cities seldom provide an effective alternative structure of
meaning and identity. The outcome is the immense attraction of
ideologies such as the various forms of what is often called
Islamic fundamentalism or, in other places, virulent and
nativistic ethnic or tribal nationalism. Today this is
particularly intense in the former Soviet bloc where no system of
personal meaning other than personal aggrandizement has filled
the psychic vacuum left by the implosion of Marxism-Leninism.
Even if ethnicity declines as a framework for identity in the
former Soviet bloc or regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle East, and South Asia, something similar will replace it
since the quest for a framework of identity and meaning is
intrinsic to humans.
The developed world has so far suffered less from lack of
effective structures for personal meaning and identity, but the
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foundation exists. Japan, the United States, and many Western
European states have seen the rise of violent, millinerian
religious cults, racist organizations, right-wing militias, and,
in the United States in particular, conspiracy- theory groups
claiming everything from a program of government mind control to
collaboration between the U.S. Government and space aliens.24
There have always been frustrated, potentially violent fringe
groups in modern societies but now electronic communications
allows them to exchange ideas, reinforce each other, and,
sometimes accrete into loose coalitions unified by shared hate or
paranoia. "Today," writes Bruce Hoffman, "the means and methods
of terrorism are readily available at bookstores, from mail-order
publishers, on CD-ROM or even over the Internet and therefore
accessible to anyone with a grievance, purpose, agenda, or any
idiosyncratic combination of the above."25 From this basis, a
coalition of hate- or paranoia-based groups could give birth to a
new and very dangerous transnational ideology built, like Fascism
and Nazism, on fear, prejudice, and violence.
Resistance to the pace of change, interconnectedness, and
global culture may become the core of future security problems.
Islamic fundamentalism and most variants of nativistic ethnicism
whether in Russia, South Africa, Rwanda or elsewhere, are part of
this. So, too, is the neo-Luddism seen at the violent fringe of
the environmental movement. Already radical environmentalists
have turned to violence in the United States and Western Europe.26
One of the most extreme movements, Earth First!, has already
developed a coherent and violent ideology.27 Against this
backdrop, Edward Luttwak contends that an ideology he calls
"communitarianism" will emerge from localist and extremist
environmentalist groups and will pose the next great challenge to
democratic capitalism.28 And, reactionary political movements in
the United States such as the "Freemen" and the various racist,
skinhead, and militia movements must also be seen as a response
to change by those unable to cope with it or who see it as a
challenge to their status. In many ways, American skinhead and
militia movements have much in common with the mullahs who led
the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the coming decades, the struggle
between those who either favor the deep changes underway or
accept them as inevitable, and those who fear and resist them
will play an absolutely vital role in shaping the global security
environment.
Military Currents.
The size, structure, doctrine, and equipment of future armed
forces will be context-specific, reflecting the threat that they
are designed to confront and the political, social, and economic
system that builds them. It is possible, though, to sketch some
currents of change that will affect nearly all the military
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organizations that exist 25 years from now. One of these will be
increasing heterogeneity among global armed forces. During
periods of homogeneity, the militaries of at least the great
powers are relatively similar in structure, methods, and
equipment. Homogeneity arises from close contacts between armed
forces including war. Sustained war is the great arbitrator,
weeding out ineffective military structures, methods, and
equipment. This is the reason that the periods following the
world wars and the Napoleonic wars saw substantial similarities
among armed forces. Even small states attempted to emulate the
structure and methods of the larger, victorious powers. By
contrast, heterogeneity increases in the absence of sustained war
and when one state is so clearly preponderant that to emulate it
would be foolhardy, challengers seek structures and methods for
their armed forces different than those of the preponderant
power.
Eventually there will be another period of homogeneity among
the armed forces of the world, but the next few decades are
likely to see increasing heterogeneity. This is due, in part, to
the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Military revolutions
always lead to profound differences between the armed forces that
undertake them and those which cannot or do not.29 Today some
militaries are embracing new technology and developing doctrine,
organizations, and methods to utilize it. The U.S. military in
particular is integrating a wide range of digital technology and
exploring the use of robotics and new synthetic materials. At the
same time, many states realize they cannot afford or fully use
cutting edge technology and thus continue to rely on older
military structures and methods. The result is a growing gap
between the unit-for-unit capability of advanced and lessadvanced militaries.
Change in the definition of security is also encouraging the
heterogeneity of armed forces. National security is becoming more
than traditional functions such as protection against foreign
enemies and the preservation of internal order as it comes to
include things like economic development and ecological
reconstruction. For instance, a draft defense white paper in
South Africa states, "Security policy is no longer a
predominantly military problem but has been broadened to
incorporate political, economic, social and environmental
matters."30 Clearly a military configured solely for traditional
functions like warfighting will be very different from one
designed to support economic development and ecological
reconstruction. The devolution of power from the sovereign
nation-state will accelerate military heterogeneity. As sub-state
and supra-state entities gain political and economic power, they
are likely to form their own armed forces. Ethnic militias are a
current example, but others may emerge. Eventually, the
coexistence of supra-state, state, and sub-state armed forces
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will make for a complex patchwork of military structures and
methods.
The revolution in military affairs is having other effects
as well. One is a reversal of the connection between the size of
an armed force and its prowess. Numbers mattered greatly in
industrial age warfare when sustained combat between sovereign
nation-states was the most important form of military activity.
But if advanced militaries make the organizational and conceptual
changes necessary to consolidate the revolution in military
affairs, small, advanced units may be more effective than the
large ones of the past. At the same time, the expense of advanced
armed forces, whether in terms of complicated equipment or in
terms of the time required to train operators of the equipment,
will make attrition warfare less viable.
A final important current of change is the blurring between
things military and things civilian. In part, this derives from
the increasing role that information and information technology
play in military activity. There is less distinction between
civilian information technology and military technology than in
other arenas. The skills needed by a future "information warrior"
will not be fundamentally different from those in charge of
corporate information security. The distinction between daily
life in the military and outside it may be insignificant. The
expanding concept of national security is also leading to a
melding of military and police activity. As criminals come to be
seen as the preeminent security threat in many countries, and as
they become better organized, better equipped, and interlinked,
armed forces and police will perform many of the same functions
and may eventually become indistinguishable. All of this means
that the distinction between military functions and civilian
functions, or between a military career and a nonmilitary career
may be less evident than in the past and may eventually fade away
all together.
PART II: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
Alternative I: A State-Based Balance of Power System.
The term "post-Cold War" is still used to describe the
current global security system. This suggests that the world is
still in a transitional phase with the system which will replace
the Cold War one not yet fully formed. It is possible, though, to
use history and existing currents of change to delineate an array
of feasible future security systems. One of these is a linear
descendent of the current system. Its most prominent
characteristic would be the persistence of autonomous nationstates which retain a near-monopoly over organized violence and
use this and other forms of power to pursue national interests.
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History suggests that a number of factors can lead to
conflict and violence in a system based on autonomous states
using power in pursuit of national interests.31 In fact, the right
to use violence under certain conditions is a widely-accepted
norm in a system based on sovereign nation-states. In particular,
conflict tends to accompany power vacuums or major shifts in the
power balance, particularly in the absence of skilled diplomacy.
For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the
decline of Turkish power in the Balkans generated conflict among
Russia, Austria, and, to some extent, Germany, thus paving the
way for World War I. Later, the decolonization of Africa and Asia
sparked a number of conflicts pitting the Soviet Union and its
allies against the United States and its allies. Power shifts can
also arise when a major state undergoes a real or perceived
decline in its relative power position and becomes aggressive in
an attempt to forestall this. At other times, authoritarian
regimes may use conflict to deflect internal discontent.
Governments may collapse or weaken to the point that civil war
ensues, drawing in external participants and sometimes leading to
interstate war.
Interstate armed conflict may also break out through
misperception or misunderstanding as states pursue their
interests. Skilled diplomacy is the palliative to misperception
and misunderstanding, and thus is vital for the maintenance of
order and the limitation of violence in a state-based, balance of
power system.32 Violence can be controlled through skillful
diplomacy, but never fully abolished. Alliances and coalitions
form and disband as the balance of power shifts. When any one
state appears willing and able to gain ascendancy in a balance of
power system, the others tend to band together to counter or
balance it.
Although nation-states may use armed force against violent
non-state enemies and internal wars are some of the most
intractable and bloodiest, state-on-state war usually poses the
greatest danger.33 This would certainly hold in a system where a
number of nations had weapons of mass destruction. In a future
state-based system, national militaries would remain the dominant
organizations for the use of force. The greater the global
involvement of a state, the wider the range of military
capabilities it would have to build. The armed forces of advanced
states will see substantial technological improvement, but those
with widespread commitments will often find that they cannot
bring their entire military to the cutting edge given the expense
of 21st century technology and talent and the diverse range of
operations armed forces must perform. There will thus be
substantial disparities between the units of even advanced
states. States will have to decide whether the most advanced
units should be the first to enter a war or saved for a decisive
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moment as Napoleon used the Old Guard and other elite formations.
Setting the strategic-level order of battle will be a crucial
process for military strategists. (See Figure 1.)
_________________________________________________________________
Strategic
Military
Characteristics
Issues
Implications
_________________________________________________________________
• Sovereign nationstates remain most
important actors
• Traditional stateon-state war remains
the most important
use of military
power
• Shifting coalitions are used to
balance and contain
powerful states
(including the
United States)

• How can power shifts
be managed?
• How can U.S. preeminence be maintained
without provoking opposition?
• How can the United
States avoid overextension?
• To what extent should
U.S. power be used to
promote intangible
interests?
• How can U.S. national
interests be reconciled
with regional or global
interests?

• Warfighting
remains the primary
mission of armed
forces
• U.S. military will
need both unilateral
and coalition capabilities
• The United States
could face a peer
competitor, probably
a coalition rather
than a single state
• Opponents would
use asymmetric
methods to contain
or defeat the U.S.
military
_________________________________________________________________
Figure 1. State-Based Balance of Power System.

State-Based System: Strategic Issues.
A number of broad, enduring issues or questions will shape
American strategy in every feasible future security system. What
is the appropriate extent of American involvement in the world?
What types of issues or areas should be the foci of American
strategy? How can public support be sustained? What is the
appropriate role of military power? These broad questions,
though, will take slightly different form and slightly different
importance in each of the plausible future systems. In a statebased system, for instance, five macro-level strategic issues are
likely to be most important.

How should power shifts be managed? Power shifts in statebased, balance of power systems are very dangerous. These can
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lead to power vacuums that tempt other states to jockey to
improve their position. U.S. strategy in a future state-based,
balance of power security system should seek to manage power
shifts, at least in key regions. This can be done by propping up
a declining power--a common technique in the classical European
balance of power between 1648 and 1914--or by engineering a new
balance to replace a defective one.34 War is usually the method of
last resort for consolidating power shifts in state-based
security systems. In a future system where a number of states
have weapons of mass destruction, this could be suicidal for the
human species. Thus developing effective procedures for the
management of power shifts would be integral to American strategy
in a state-based, balance of power security system. In
particular, American leaders would have to gauge the effect that
the information revolution has on the practice of diplomacy.

How could U.S. preeminence be maintained without provoking
the formation of opposing alliances or coalitions? Americans tend
to assume that others see U.S. power as benign or benevolent and
recognize that the United States has no desire for territorial
aggrandizement. This overlooks the fact that in a state-based
international system where every nation seeks its own interests,
preponderance or preeminence by one invariably causes suspicion,
perhaps even fear, in others. State-based, balance of power
systems have always seen formal or informal coalitions form to
counter the power of a dominant state, even when the dominant
power was a democracy.
Americans traditionally overlook the seriousness with which
the citizens of other countries take what they see as cultural
and economic imperialism. During the Cold War and the immediate
post-Cold War periods, many states saw U.S. power as the lesser
of evils when compared to that of aggressive authoritarian states
like the Soviet Union or Iraq. But if the United States succeeds
in helping spread democracy to Iraq and consolidating open
government in the former Soviet Union, the nations of the world
may come to see American power as intimidating or even
threatening. That current American strategy stresses "engagement
and enlargement" is worrisome to others even though U.S.
policymakers seem unaware or unconcerned that this can be
construed as imperialistic. 35
The belief that others will see a strong democracy as
benevolent is an old one. In 431 B.C., Pericles, the leader of
Athens, stated:
. . . there is a great contrast between us and most
other people. We make friends by doing good to others,
not be receiving good from them . . . We are unique in
this. When we do kindnesses to others, we do not do
them out of any calculations of profit or loss; we do
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them without afterthought, relying on our free
liberality.36
Within a few years of this speech, most of the Greek citystates, concerned about the power and growing arrogance of
Athens, allied against it and defeated it. This precedent
suggests that if the United States continued to use force and
other forms of power as it did during the Cold War and post-Cold
War periods, many or most of the other nations of the world would
seek to contain the United States. Given this possibility,
American policymakers would have to be extraordinarily careful in
their exercise of power if the future security system relies on a
balance of power as the major means of preserving order. Finding
a nonintimidating way to use military power would be a key
objective and may become a factor in the formulation of U.S.
military strategy and even force structure decisions.

How can the United States avoid strategic overextension? To
be a "superpower" implies some sort of involvement in all regions
of the world and, taken to its extreme, in nearly all conflicts
around the world. After some hesitation, the United States
accepted this role during the early years of the Cold War. As the
Cold War waned, the United States rejected major retrenchment.
Like George Bush, Bill Clinton and his top advisers repeatedly
stress that the United States intends to remain globally engaged.
"The United States," President Clinton states, "recognizes that
we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a
great power. . ."37
In a future state-based, balance of power system, strategic
overextension would be a persistent temptation. The United States
could not rely on friends or allies to take actions which would
be in perfect accordance with U.S. national interests, and thus
would be tempted to become directly involved in a wide range of
global problems and conflicts. The issue of strategic "solvency"-assuring that objectives and power resources are in proportion-would remain important.38 At a minimum, the United States would
have to re-think its geostrategic priorities. U.S. strategy
during the Cold War was clearly Eurocentric (even though American
military power was used extensively in Asia). That was logical
since Europe was both the region of greatest U.S. interest and
the one facing the most imminent security threat. This may not
hold in the future security environment. A case can be made that
U.S. strategy should be refocused on the Pacific Rim or on the
Americas.39 This is an issue that will require much open
discussion and debate before a consensus emerges.

To what extent should national power be used to promote
intangible interests? American foreign policy has long had a deep
streak of idealism. This has sometimes led the nation to expend
power resources to promote intangible interests like democracy,
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human rights, and well-being in regions with few vital tangible
economic or geostrategic interests. Deciding whether the
distinction between tangible and intangible interests retains
relevance and, if so, how much national power should be expended
to promote intangible interests will be an important part of
crafting a coherent strategy if the future security system is a
state-based, balance of power one.

How can national interests be reconciled with regional or
global interests as the notion of sovereignty changes? A statebased security system is one in which national interests shape
and drive strategy. Today, communal interests--whether of a
region or of the globe as a whole--are becoming more important.
These issues range from prevention of genocide to a host of
ecological issues that spill over national boundaries. The
traditional notion of sovereignty that gave a state full license
within its boundaries is also changing. Thus a future state-based
security system would see the coexistence of national interests
and communal interests. Reconciling the two and deciding how much
sovereignty to surrender to supra-state organizations or
authorities could pose a major problem for American leaders.
State-Based System: Military Implications.
In a state-based, balance of power security system, the
revolution in military affairs would change the structure,
doctrine, concepts and equipment of the U.S. military but not the
ultimate strategic missions. Warfighting against the military
forces of other states would remain the primary task of the
American armed forces with nation support and humanitarian relief
secondary. Balance of power systems tend to be characterized by
fluid coalitions and alliances rather than formal, long-standing
ones, so the United States would need to retain a substantial
capability for unilateral action and for leading ad hoc, missionspecific coalitions. And, to avoid ostentatious displays of
military power that might provoke opposition, forward presence
would probably be reduced if not abandoned. In fact, the U.S.
military could lose all of its large, permanent overseas bases.
This would suggest a need for the ability to rapidly construct
temporary bases for power projection, or to project power from
the continental United States alone. In general, power projection
could become more the application of effects from long range
rather than the actual deployment of forces configured for close
engagement. As a result, American ground forces would probably be
fairly small.
In a state-based, balance of power system, the United States
could continue to face substate and regional threats, but could
also be confronted with a peer competitor. Given the historic
tendency of opposition to coalesce against a preeminent state,

18

this would probably be a coalition rather than a single state.
Existing U.S. military strategy, which assumes that American
forces will face a singe rogue state rather than a hostile
coalition, would have to be revised to reflect this. And, U.S.
military strategy and doctrine in a state-based balance of power
security system would have to deal with extensive asymmetry. This
would take two forms. One is asymmetric coalitions as American
armed forces sometimes operate in conjunction with other
militaries with very different organization and doctrine. The
second is asymmetric threats. Future opponents will likely avoid
confronting the U.S. military on its own terms and, instead, seek
methods of confrontation and warfare in which the United States
is weak. These asymmetric threats would usually target American
political vulnerabilities, particularly the difficulty accepting
substantial casualties in conflicts were vital interests are not
directly challenged. Enemies in a future state-based system will
often use weapons of mass destruction to counteract U.S.
conventional forces, eroding American morale and political will
through low-intensity operations, especially terrorism aimed at
U.S. nationals abroad and within the United States. Terrorism
would probably increasingly move into information attacks and
those attempting what Walter Laqueur calls "terrorist
superviolence." Laqueur notes, "An unnamed U.S. intelligence
official has boasted that with $1 billion and 20 capable hackers,
he could shut down America. What he could achieve, a terrorist
could too."40 Terrorism aimed at information infrastructure and
using weapons of mass destruction would become a major problem
for the U.S. military in a state-based security system.
Alternative II: A Trisected Security System.
In some security systems, there is a clear, central source
of conflict. But these are rare. The norm is a system shaped by
several more-or-less coequal sources of conflict. The future
system may fit this mold. Since interconnectedness and
demassification are advancing at different rates in different
parts of the world, the likely result is a global system composed
of three tiers. Trisection is actually a common pattern for
global or regional political systems. The ancient Greeks and
Chinese divided the world into "civilized," "semi-civilized," and
"barbarian" parts. Muslims distinguished those who followed
Islam, the "peoples of the book" (Jews and Christians who shared
some basic religious tenets with Muslims), and heathens. The
"world-system" analysis that became popular in Western
universities in the 1970s reflected a more economically-oriented
scheme based on "core," "periphery," and "semi-periphery."41 Even
more recently, scholars and strategists talked of the First,
Second, and Third worlds while Marxists divided the world into
capitalist, socialist, and proletarian segments. This frequent
recurrence of trisection suggests that it may be a natural form
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for international systems.
If the future security system should once again be a
trisected one, the First Tier of the system will be characterized
by stability, prosperity, and multidimen-sional integration. Its
economies will depend on the management, manipulation, and
creation of information rather than traditional heavy industry.
Demassification and interconnectedness will be most strongly felt
here. Businesses (and, eventually, governments) will stress
flexibility and creativity, with a diminishing distinction among
management, development, and production in terms of both
functions and people. Economic interdependence and cultural
homogeneity will link the First Tier into a seamless web. As the
First Tier integrates, concepts such as national interests,
national boundaries, and sovereignty will decline in
significance. Governments will often see themselves as the agents
of business. Even though First Tier regions will experience some
serious political conflict growing from the difficulty in
adjusting to the various currents of change, governments will be
generally effective at least in providing basic resources like
security. Democracy will be increasingly participatory as
technology allows a regular and sustained citizen role in
political decisionmaking. Aversion to violence will be a major
component of the First Tier ethical system. Force will be seen as
an absolute last resort, with intense pressure to keep military
activity quick and cheap. Security strategies will stress
conflict prevention; military strategies will be defensive.
The Second Tier will be composed of what are today known as
"newly industrializing countries" and the more advanced states of
the former Soviet bloc. Traditional industrial production will
remain the economic bedrock. The distinction among management,
development, and production will persist, with social status and
political power closely linked to an individual's position in the
productive process. The state and business will sometimes be
coequals; at other times, one or the other will temporarily
dominate. The sovereign nation-state will remain the central
political and economic institution. The most intense political
debates in the Second Tier will pit those who seek greater
integration into the First Tier-dominated world culture and
economy against those who oppose it and, instead, favor economic
nationalism and cultural particularism. The Second Tier will see
cycles in which representative democracy emerges only to later be
replaced by some form of sham democracy or outright
authoritarianism. The shifts to and from democracy are likely to
be violent. Secessionism will pose a major challenge to the
governability, viability, and stability of many Second Tier
states. In fact, secessionism in the Second Tier will pose some
of the most dangerous challenges to the stability of the future
security system. Sovereignty will be jealously guarded by Second
Tier leaders. Their security and military strategies will remain
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imbued with the notion of just war and the idea that national
interests sometimes require the use of state-controlled violence.
By contrast, economic stagnation, ungovernability, and
violence will be pervasive in the Third Tier. Informal economies
based on subsistence production, barter, and crime will be more
important than the formal economy for most citizens of the Third
Tier. Parts of the Third Tier will remain linked to the global
economy through the extraction and export of primary products and
the import of manufactured goods and foreign aid, but this will
only affect a small proportion of the population. Governments
will continue to dominate these shrinking formal sectors of the
economy, with the relationship largely a parasitic one. Most
areas of the Third Tier will abandon or be abandoned by the world
culture, thus leading to the emergence of distinct microcultures. Ironically, this will be something of a boon since it
will lead to the export of intellectual products like art and
music to First Tier consumers in quest of "something different."
The Third Tier will experience recurrent bouts of
ungovernability. The effectiveness of the state will drop
dramatically outside major cities, and will be minimal even in
large parts of the urban areas. Outright anarchy will be common,
and many current states will fragment. Democracy will be
attempted but almost always fail. Ungovernability will be
exacerbated by an accelerated "brain drain" as the educated and
ambitious immigrate. Ironically, though, there will also be
immigration into the Third Tier by groups of economic, political,
and cultural dissenters from the First Tier which reject
integration into the global economy and culture. If history
holds, these groups may energize otherwise stagnant economies.
Where the First Tier will be characterized by a widespread
aversion to violence and the Second Tier by the notion that
violence is justified under certain conditions (e.g., when used
by the state in pursuit of legitimate national interests),
violence in the Third Tier will be a routine part of daily life.
Ethical constructs like "just war" or casualty aversion will have
little meaning in a region where gunfire, explosions, coercion,
and personal brutality are depressingly normal. (See Figure 2.)
Trisected System: Strategic Issues.
For the United States, the most important characteristics of
a trisected security system would be the heterogeneity and
complexity of the strategic environment. First Tier states would
_________________________________________________________________
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Figure 2. Trisected Security System.
not make traditional war on each other, so terrorism would be the
only direct threat to the territory of the United States. Since
most applications of U.S. military power would continue to be
overseas, American strategy would focus on minimizing casualties
during military operations. Six key questions would shape U.S.
national security strategy.

To what extent should U.S. national security strategy focus
on one tier of the global security system? In a trisected global
system, the United States will have interests of one sort or the
other in all three tiers, but to expend substantial power
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resources in all three simultaneously would risk dangerous overextension. This suggests that American strategy should focus on
one or two of them. The question is: Which one? To resolve this,
policymakers and the American public would have to reach
consensus on the level of risk the United States is willing to
accept.42 If the nation can tolerate a high level of risk in one
tier, resources can be concentrated in the other. Moreover,
American strategy must also reconcile the risk of overextension
with risks to specific interests in one of the tiers of the
system.

If the United States chooses to focus its strategy on one
tier, which one should it be? A rationale can be developed for an
American strategy focused on each of the tiers of a trisected
security system. Just as today the United States has the greatest
economic and political interests in the areas of the world that
will develop into the First Tier--North America, Western Europe,
and parts of the Pacific Rim--future U.S. ties to the First Tier
will be crucial. On the other hand, the security threats from the
First Tier are likely to be less overtly dangerous than from the
other two tiers, particularly as the First Tier undergoes
economic, political, and cultural integration. The fact that
Second Tier states will have the industrial and organizational
base to support large armed forces and sustained military
operations--and that many of them will have weapons of mass
destruction--suggests a strategy concentrated on this sector of
the global security system. This might be a matter of pure
strategic triage: the security situation in the First Tier will
probably not require the extensive application of U.S. power. The
problems of the Third Tier cannot be remedied by any feasible
level of American involvement; but the Second Tier may be both
dangerous and amenable to active U.S. engagement. At the same
time, though, the humanitarian needs of the Third Tier will be
most pressing. All this means that American policymakers and the
public must decide which will be the guiding criterion of
national strategy: the extent of American interests, the extent
of the danger inherent in a particular region, or the extent of
human need.
How should U.S. interests be protected and promoted in the
tiers of the global security system which are not the focus of
American strategy? Even if U.S. strategy focuses on one sector of
a three-tiered system, interests in the other tiers would have to
be promoted and protected. This might be done through nonmilitary
means. American policymakers would have to decide how and when
military force might be used in what are defined as "secondary"
tiers. In general, military strategy in secondary tiers could
follow three broad patterns. It could focus simply on containment
through maritime and aerospace power (including missile defense)
without using forward presence or pursuing conflict resolution.
It could seek to deter aggression in secondary tiers through
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periodic direct applications of military force, most often by
stand-off precision strikes. Or, it could rely on coalitions.
Actual American military strategy for secondary tiers would
probably blend these three approaches in some way and would shift
as technology and political conditions change.

Will power projection and conflict resolution remain core
elements of the U.S. strategy? Power projection and conflict
resolution became important parts of American national security
strategy during the Cold War. Power projection kept conflict away
from American shores. Policymakers considered conflict
resolution, which entails the amelioration of the underlying
political, social, and economic causes of violence rather than
simply winning battlefield victory, important and concluded that
most conflicts left unresolved would not solve themselves, but
would eventually reemerge. In a future trisected security system,
Americans may reconsider this stress on power projection and
conflict resolution. Both are expensive and dangerous. They
invite asymmetric responses, especially terrorism aimed at
Americans or targets within the United States, and can require
long commitments of human and financial resources. Given this, it
is possible that future American strategy will be much more
defensive, stressing maritime and aerospace control with ground
forces used solely for spoiling attacks or to supplement allies
facing aggression. This issue must be debated and a consensus
reached if U.S. strategy in a trisected world is to be coherent
and effective.
To what extent should the United States retain a unilateral
military capability? Current American national security and
military strategy commit the nation to working with allies and
coalition partners whenever possible but also stress the need for
a full-spectrum unilateral capability. JCS Chairman General John
M. Shalikashvili, for instance, lists "decisive unilateral
strength" as one objective in his Joint Vision 2010.43 In a
trisected world of 2020 and beyond, though, the United States may
not be willing or may not see the need to maintain decisive
unilateral strength. The integration of the First Tier may mean
that all military operations except the very smallest are
coalition endeavors. The question of how long to retain decisive
unilateral capability is likely to be a persistent one in the
coming decades. That, plus the decision concerning which tier of
the system to focus on, will drive the size of the American
military.
To what extent should the United States pursue integration
with the rest of the First Tier? As the First Tier of a trisected
system undergoes economic, social, and then political
integration, there is likely to be mounting public pressure to
integrate national armed forces in order to limit defense
expenditures. First Tier militaries which often operate in
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coalition may decide to specialize rather than seek a full
spectrum capability. And, beyond simply making militaries more
compatible, the First Tier is also likely to see increased formal
coordination during strategy and policy formulation. A key issue
for the United States will be how rapidly to accept this process
of integration. The United States will probably resist longer and
more strenuously than most other First Tier states but will
accept some integration in the end.
Trisected System: Military Implications.
In a trisected global security system, each tier would focus
on different forms of conflict and configure their military
forces accordingly. First Tier militaries will probably develop
along the lines suggested by current thinking about the
revolution in military affairs.44 Armed forces will be small in
terms of the number of people involved, but will make extensive
use of technology. Robotics, information technology, and
nanotechnology--the ability to mechanically manipulate molecules
and molecular structures during assembly and manufacture--will
become increasingly important.45 Military units will be extremely
flexible, able to rapidly reorganize and adapt to a wide variety
of tasks. Defensive information warfare--protecting information
systems against hostile action--will be an important military
mission. First Tier armed forces will also develop offensive
information warfare to disable or confuse opponents. In fact,
information warfare will be the only type of military action that
First Tier states would consider using against each other given
the restraints growing from interconnectedness. However,
information warfare will also have utility against Second Tier
and even some Third Tier enemies.
Even though First Tier states will not wage traditional war
against each other, they will occasionally use violence against
Second Tier and Third Tier enemies. As First Tier states prepare
for this, the need to minimize casualties will play a major role
in force development. For instance, weapons systems will be
deconstructed in that the sensor, operator, and strike platform
will be physically separated rather than coterminous as in many
of today's planes, warships, tanks, or infantry units. Soldiers
on the future battlefield, Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder
suggest, may be more important as sensors feeding information to
distant strike platforms than as a source of firepower.46 At the
same time, robotics and other brilliant weapons platforms will
become increasingly important. Long-range, stand off strikes and
reliance on nonlethal or less-lethal weapons (including weapons
aimed at psychological incapacitation rather than physical harm)
will be the norm.
Because of casualty aversion and the expense of weapons
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systems based on advanced technology, what might be called
"burst" operations will replace sustained campaigns as the most
important form of military activity. Political decisionmakers
will be unwilling to use their powerful but small and casualtyaverse militaries in any activity that cannot be completed
quickly. Militaries will adapt to this by the revolutionary
transformation of doctrine and mastery of burst operations. Burst
operations will not require or allow mobilization, whether of
military forces or political support, so military reserves will
not be important. Military strategy will largely consist of
active defense and spoiling or punishing attacks. These attacks
are likely to become more psychologically sophisticated as First
Tier military planners learn how to structure and time strikes to
have the maximum psychological impact on target audiences. The
main tasks of senior military leaders will be to rapidly adapt
and reconfigure military organizations as tasks and conditions
change, and to plan burst operations. Given this, the essence of
strategic leadership will be creativity in complex and compressed
decision environments.
First Tier states will also undergo radical changes in
civil-military relations. The core dilemma for traditional civilmilitary relations was finding a way to cultivate and sustain a
body of people with the ability to do things considered abnormal
by civilians--to transcend physical discomfort, master fear, and
kill or coerce enemies-- without undercutting the day-to-day
comity that undergirds society. This required simultaneously
cultivating a warfighter's ethos and instilling the belief that
violence must only be used under very special circumstances and
against specific targets. Stable civil-military relations kept
warfighters separate from the rest of society (physically and
psychologically) without allowing them to become so isolated that
they might turn against society. In the future, this may not be
necessary. First Tier armed forces seldom will need to undergo
physical hardships or kill at close range. Killing itself will be
limited. When it does become necessary, it can be done from far
away or by robots. This means that First Tier states will no
longer have to erect a psychological and attitudinal wall between
the military and society. Soldiering will be much like any other
white-collar job. The notion of a distinct military ethos will
become quaintly archaic.
By contrast, the armed forces of Second Tier states will
still focus on war in the traditional, Clausewitzean sense with
its sequence of preparation, mobilization, combat operations, and
demobilization. They will also retain distinct militaries
organized around separate services defined by the medium in which
they operate. Because Second Tier states will have a higher
tolerance for casualties, their militaries will place relatively
less emphasis on expensive technology and more on the blood of
soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. Unlike First Tier armed
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forces, Second Tier militaries will be capable of sustained,
costly, intense operations or campaigns. Second Tier militaries
will rely heavily on commercial technology. They will also remain
vulnerable to information warfare since they will be end-users of
cutting edge technology rather than its masters.
Nuclear weapons may be used somewhere in the Second Tier
before 2020. If this happens, it will result in such a political
backlash that for nation-states, weapons of mass destruction will
be relegated to a purely deterrent role (although terrorists will
continue to find them useful). Second Tier militaries will have a
moderate power projection capability against each other, but will
have limited or no success against First Tier armed forces. The
essence of strategic leadership for Second Tier militaries will
remain synchronization during complex operations and the
balancing of short-term and long-term security considerations.
Civil-military relations will follow the 20th century model, with
the military psychologically and physically separated from
civilian society but usually controlled by civilians.
Third Tier armed forces will take the form of armed gangs,
militias, the personal armies of warlords, and terrorist groups.
The Third Tier will have no indigenous military production, so
its armed forces will have very limited ability to wage
sustained, combined-arms operations. The norm will be short,
intense periods of combat that exhaust military supplies followed
by long periods of low-level fighting or maneuver. In general,
there will be no clear distinction between war and peace since
much of the Third Tier will experience nearly constant, low-level
organized violence. As in Europe before the Treaty of Westphalia,
the acquisition of materiel or loot is likely to be the
preeminent objective of Third Tier military operations. Terrorism
will be the only form of long-range power projection available to
Third Tier political organizations. But, because the nature of
Third Tier life will cause an erosion of ethical restrictions or
inhibitions on the use of violence, states or warlords will have
no compunction about using terrorism. The most important
leadership skill will be the ability to motivate subordinates to
accept danger and remain loyal. Personal charisma, which will
matter less in First Tier and Second Tier armed forces, will
characterize successful Third Tier military leaders. There will
be little distinction between the military and society, and thus
no civil-military relations in the traditional sense.
In general, conflict across the three tiers will be like the
children's game "scissors, paper, and rock." High-tech First Tier
militaries will be able to defeat the large and somewhat lowertech forces of Second Tier states with relative ease, but will
find casualty aversion a serious constraint when fighting the
militias, terrorists, and private armies of the Third Tier.
Second Tier militaries, with their large size, ability to
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undertake sustained, intense operations, and greater tolerance
for casualties, will have more success against Third Tier forces.
And, while Third Tier forces will be unable to stand and face
Second Tier militaries, they will find that their lack of
inhibition on the use of indiscriminate violence gives them some
influence in the First Tier, particularly when they can use
terrorism to extort aid or deter intervention. This all means
that First Tier militaries will be able to trump Second Tier,
Second Tier militaries will be able to trump Third Tier, and
Third Tier will be able to trump First Tier.
Alternative III: The Renaissance of Ideology.
With the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, the world is not
clearly divided by competing transnational ideologies. This may
be a temporary lull rather than a permanent "end of ideology" as
predicted by Daniel Bell in the 1960s or, more recently, by
Francis Fukayama.47 Humans seem to have an instinctive
psychological need for some sort of mass belief system--whether
it is called a political ideology or not--that explains social
conditions and offers apparently coherent solutions to political
and economic problems. As the 21st century approaches, it might
seem that nationalism and ethnicism have supplanted ideology as
the primary framework of social and political identity. This
overlooks the fact that nationalism is only on the rise in a
relatively small segment of the global security system--the
former Soviet bloc. The same is true of the argument that
ethnicity will be the dominant political force in the future
security environment. This only holds for regions a generation or
two removed from colonialism (whether European or Soviet) and
very well may subside in the early 21st century. As global
interconnectedness grows, it is possible that nationalism and
ethnicism will no longer define political divisions and thus not
serve as the primary sources of world conflict. Given the intense
pace of change that will characterize the 21st century and the
feelings of powerlessness that it will generate among much of the
world's population, conditions may be ripe for the reemergence of
transnational ideologies.
The ideologies of the future could take several forms.
Samuel P. Huntington has argued that the next pattern of conflict
may be a clash of civilizations.48 "Civilizations" in the sense
that Huntington uses the term are psychologically related to
ethnicity, but are based on beliefs, values, preferences, and
norms rather than the sort of physical or linguistic
characteristics that undergird ethnicity. In Huntington's schema,
the "fault line" running through Europe that divides Western
Christianity from Orthodox Christianity and Islam will be
particularly dangerous. This could lead to a bipolar security
system pitting nations based on Western culture (to include
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Japan) against a coalition of non-Western cultures. There are
other conceivable configurations for an ideological bloc system:
democracies versus anti-democracies, capitalism versus anticapitalism of some sort, modernizers versus anti-modernizers,
globalists versus regionalists, and so on.
In any security system dominated by ideological blocs, most
armed conflict will occur along the fault lines or grey areas.
War will sometimes accompany the process of establishing or
adjusting the boundaries between blocs. Violence may break out
when a state attempts to move from one bloc to the other.
Violence would also be associated with attempts by members of one
bloc to support dissenters inside opposing blocs since whenever
ideology is intense, governments have little tolerance for
internal opposition. Witness the "red scares" in the United
States in the 1930s and 1950s, and Stalin's various purges.
Conflict and violence in an ideology-based system would range
from terrorism and insurgency through full-scale coalition war,
so militaries would need to retain a wide range of capabilities.
Within blocs, militaries would probably develop along similar
lines, in part to facilitate coalition operations. But, as during
other ideological struggles whether the Cold War or the Crusades,
there would be significant differences between the military
forces of the blocs. Because violence between conflicting belief
systems tends to be particularly vicious, there would be little
pressure to limit collateral damage or civilian casualties during
military operations. Decisive victory at any cost would be the
preeminent criterion for military strategy and force development.
(See Figure 3.)
Ideology-Based System: Strategic Issues.
Because ideology often breeds hatred and passion, a future
security system dominated by it would be partic- ularly
dangerous. Seven strategic issues would be the most important for
the United States.

What is the appropriate extent of U.S. involvement in global
security affairs? Even in a future with extensive political,
economic, and social interconnectedness, large-scale violence in
an ideology-based security system will likely occur far from the
United States. This, in conjunction with the inherent danger of
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Figure 3. Ideology-Based System.

an ideology-based system, would encourage isolationism in the
United States. In fact, pressure for retrenchment or
disengagement of some type would probably be stronger in an
ideology-based system than in any other sort. This means that
deciding on the appropriate degree of American involvement would
be the cornerstone strategic issue in such a system. Options
range from military disengagement to full engagement as in the
Cold War. The extent of American involvement in world affairs
would be the prime factor determining the size of the U.S.
military in an ideology-based system.

How can the "rules of the game" be consolidated? Every
international system has rules. These are sometimes codified
through treaties and international law, but can also take the
form of informal strictures and parameters. Rules are sometimes
breached but, the more they are adhered to, the more stable the
system. In a state-based, balance of power system, the rules tend
to be fairly well understood but states face some uncertainty as
to who their friends and enemies are since coalitions shift
easily. An ideologically-based system is the opposite: states in
hostile ideological blocs know who their enemies are, but the
misperception and mistrust that accompanies ideological schisms
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often lead to unclear or poorly understood rules of the game. In
a future ideologically-based system--especially one where many
states and even some sub-state actors have weapons of mass
destruction--the United States would need to find ways to clarify
the rules of the game as quickly as possible.

How can conflicts be localized or contained? The worst
possible situation in an ideologically-based system is total war
between opposing blocs. Historically, such conflicts were
devastating; in an era when weapons of mass destruction are
increasingly widespread, full-scale inter-bloc war could
literally lead to the obliteration of the human species. Because
of this, the major powers in an ideology-based system must
undertake great efforts to develop mechanisms for cauterizing and
containing regional conflicts. There are a number of mechanisms
for this: non-intervention agreements, bolstering the defense of
states surrounding an area of conflict, collaborative
intervention by the major powers, and so on. The most effective
mechanism will, of course, depend on the specifics of a conflict.
But the leaders of hostile ideological blocs must recognize and
agree on the dangers of allowing regional conflicts to escalate-a lesson lost in 1914 on the leaders of a European system that
had transmutated from a balance of power one to an ideological
one.
How can use of weapons of mass destruction be avoided? If
the future security system does become an ideological one,
weapons of mass destruction will hang over every major conflict
like the sword of Damocles. By the time the future security
system coalesces, many states will have weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them. Nonproliferation as it
existed in the last few decades of the 20th century will be
obsolete. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that weapons of
mass destruction will be used at some point in the next 30 years.
It will be incumbent on all the great powers, particularly the
United States, to mobilize pressure to prevent their use from
becoming routine. This will be difficult in an ideologicallybased system with its intense passions and hatreds.
How can the American public be mobilized but not inflamed?
If the United States opts for active engagement in a future
ideologically-based system, American leaders would have to find a
way to mobilize the public for the sacrifices and efforts such
engagement would entail but avoid inflaming the public to the
point that there is pressure for war. Building and sustaining
this fragile balance between too little public passion and too
much was actually one of the great (but overlooked) successes of
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations during the early years
of the Cold War. If the future security system is an ideological
one like the early Cold War system, such an endeavor would have
to be undertaken by future U.S. administrations. Their success or
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failure would be an important determinant of the overall
stability of the global security system.

If global schisms are based on religion, how can the United
States avoid domestic tension? If analysts like Samuel Huntington
are correct, religion--particularly tension between Islam and
Christianity--will play a major part in determining the fault
lines and schisms of the future security system. This will pose
some serious domestic problems for the United States. The United
States is becoming increasingly multicultural. The number of
Islamic Americans in particular is growing rapidly. According to
Elisabeth Siddiqui:
At present, the number of Muslims in the United States
is estimated to be on the order of between 5 to 8
million. It is the fastest growing faith in this
country. Estimates indicate that by the year 2000, the
number of Muslims in the United States will be greater
than that of the Methodists, and that by the year 2010
the number will have doubled to 10 to 16 million. The
estimated conversion rate among Americans is 135,000
per year. The Defense Department reports that there are
now approximately 9000 Muslims on active duty in the
U.S. armed services (it is reported that more than 3000
Americans embraced Islam during the Gulf war alone). A
vast network of Muslim ministries also caters to some
300,000 converts in prisons, with an estimated
conversion rate of 35,000 per year.49
American Muslims have already faced harassment following
acts of terrorism linked (or thought to be linked) to the
politics of the Middle East.50 In an ideologically-based future
security system, this could be much worse. If the future global
security environment is dominated by Islam/Christian differences,
American leaders will have to be careful to prevent this from
exacerbating tensions within the United States.

How can the United States craft a total or holistic
strategy? More than any other type of security system,
ideologically-based ones require a "total" or holistic strategy
fully integrating the political, economic, psychological, and
military elements of national power.51 For a variety of reasons,
some dealing with the distribution of power within the government
and some dealing with an attitude toward the use of force that
sees it as an aberration rather than an integral part of
strategy, crafting and sustaining a coherent, holistic strategy
is somewhat difficult for Americans. To do so in a exceedingly
dangerous ideologically-based security system would probably
require fundamental reform of the strategy-making mechanisms used
in the United States. In particular, inter-agency cooperation
would need to be strengthened. This would require fundamental
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reform of the policymaking system. Because major reorganization
always leads to the loss of power by some individuals or
institutions and its transfer to others, such change would be
difficult and require sustained, high-level involvement.
Ideology-Based System: Military Implications.
The inherent rigidity of an ideologically-based security
system diminishes the effectiveness of diplomacy. In a world
filled with weapons of mass destruction, states will attempt to
forestall conflict with diplomacy, but it is always difficult to
negotiate on core beliefs and, in an ideologically-based system,
that is what is at stake. Many diplomatic stratagems are ruled
out a priori because they are seen as "striking a deal with the
devil." As a result, the military element of national power rises
in importance. The U.S. military could probably expect higher
defense expenditures and a larger force in an ideologically-based
security system than in one built on a flexible balance of power.
An ideologically-based system has a much clearer and more
rigid strategic geography than a balance of power system since
conflict and violence tend to occur along the fault lines or grey
areas between the ideological blocs. If American policymakers opt
for extensive U.S. involvement in promoting the security of one
bloc or in serving as some sort of buffer between them, that is
where the military would be involved. In addition to deterring
aggression and defending along the bloc fault lines, the U.S.
military would also be used to reassure weaker or nonaligned
states by helping them with external defense and with internal
order. Because an ideologically-based system would involve longstanding, formal alliances rather than the fluid, ad hoc
coalitions that typify a balance of power system, the U.S.
military would have the time necessary to resolve
interoperability problems with its partners. The problem of
asymmetry--which is sure to arise as the United States pursues
the revolution in military affairs and other nations cannot or do
not--would persist. And, because the zone of conflict in an
ideologically-based system would be geographically defined, this
is the global security system that would require the greatest
amount of U.S. landpower (assuming American policymakers opt for
engagement). This does not necessarily imply that an extremely
large U.S. Army would be necessary since the revolution in
military affairs is likely to allow technology to compensate for
numbers, but effective U.S. landpower would be required to
support and bolster allies in the zone of conflict.
Alternative IV: Internal Collapse.
Strategic thinkers such as Ralph Peters and Martin van
Creveld contend that the most significant source of conflict in
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the future security system will not be traditional state-on-state
war, but the power struggles involving sub-state actors such as
criminal cartels, militarized gangs, private armies, terrorists,
ethnic militias, and insurgents.52 Even developed states would
face serious threats from organized crime, urban gangs, regional
separatists, conspiracy-theory terrorism, radical cults, neoLuddites, and violent environmentalists. If this comes to pass,
the future security system may be one in which the primary threat
is internal disorder.
In such a system, democracy and civil rights would be
abrogated in the name of public safety. Authoritarianism would be
the norm; anarchy would be common in regions with less resilient
or resource-rich states. Governments would be so busy dealing
with internal problems that they would have little energy or
inclination for traditional interstate war. The major form of
military power projection might be the support or threatened
support of rebels, insurgents, terrorists, and militias
destabilizing hostile states. Militaries would take the form of
national police, gendarmes, or special forces. They might be
high-tech, but would have little capacity for large-scale, longrange power projection. Nations would build armed forces to
counter insurgency, terrorism and other forms of violence within
the state's borders and inside friendly states, and to support
insurgency and terrorism within the borders of enemies. The major
factors distinguishing the armed forces of different states would
be the level of technological advancement and the degree to which
the use of violence against internal enemies was constrained or
unconstrained. In general, more advanced militaries could afford
to be more restrained in the use of violence, substituting
technology, especially information and psychological technology,
for primitive violence. Less sophisticated armed forces would
have to rely on old-fashioned brutality.(See Figure 4.)
Internal Collapse: Strategic Issues.
The United States would face four major strategic issues in
a global security system characterized by internal conflict and
the collapse or near-collapse of national governments.
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Figure 4. Internal Collapse.

Where and how should the United States help reestablish
order? A global security system permeated with internal collapse
and endemic violence between a chaotic array of militias, warlord
armies, and gangs of various kinds could stoke isolationism
within the United States. There would be a great need for
humanitarian involvement but engagement would often be
entangling, risking violence against Americans for limited
political gains. The tendency in the United States would be to
provide humanitarian assistance where possible and punish armed
groups for direct attacks on Americans, but, other than that, to
simply let warring factions kill each other until they tire of it
and request outside political involvement and, sometimes, peacekeepers. The notion that a conflict is only "ripe for resolution"
under specific conditions would gain wide credence among
strategic thinkers.
American involvement in a world dominated by the collapse of
political order could be measured on two scales which, to some
extent, overlay one another. The first is geographic. The United
States would have to decide whether to continue to pursue global
engagement or to limit itself to one or a few regions. Clearly,
it would be more difficult to disengage from a chaotic Central
America and Caribbean than an equally disorderly Africa. The
second scale of involvement would be one of intensity. The
greatest level of involvement would engage the United States
(including the U.S. military) in defending friends, punishing
aggressors, and actively working to engineer solutions to various
conflicts. The other end of the scale would be minimal
involvement, perhaps only the provision of relief supplies to
multinational or private humanitarian organizations. In between
would be a whole range of options involving the greater or lesser

35

use of American power. A consensus on where American strategy
should fall along these two scales would be fundamental.

Should the United States support friendly tyrants, warlords,
or separatists? As in contemporary Somalia and Bosnia, there
would seldom be a clear "good guy" in a security system permeated
by internal collapse. Most of the time, all the groups locked in
conflict would be guilty of some sort of transgression of human
rights and civil liberties. Yet many of them would seek U.S.
assistance and would be willing to offer political and economic
rewards in exchange. As during much of the Cold War, the United
States would have to decide whether to accept, perhaps even
embrace, friendly tyrants, warlords, or separatists. Good
arguments can be made both for and against this. On one hand, if
tyrants, warlords, or separatists are the only sources of local
power and authority, working with them would be the sole method
by which the United States could influence the situation, bring
humanitarian relief, and possibly prod a conflict toward
resolution of some sort. On the other hand, developing a
relationship with friendly tyrants, warlords, gang leaders, and
separatists always runs the danger of associating the United
States with unsavory, embarrassing, perhaps even evil friends,
with a concomitant erosion of prestige and public support for an
activist policy. This issue was important in shaping post-Vietnam
U.S. policy in the Third World.53 In a future system characterized
by the collapse of states, it would surface again.
How should the United States deal with militias, terrorists,
and criminal gangs who are able to acquire weapons of mass
destruction? Even though militias, terrorists, and criminal gangs
may not be able to muster the technological resources to develop
their own weapons of mass destruction, they will eventually
capture, steal, or purchase some. These may be "traditional"
weapons based on biological, chemical, or nuclear technology.
Even today, terrorists are actively pursuing these things.54 Or
the weapons of future terrorists may instead be computer programs
or devices able to do massive and rapid damage to national
electronic infrastructure. While it is impossible to predict how
and where this will happen or what the appropriate response will
be, it is fairly certain that the United States will have to deal
with new levels of terrorism in coming decades. Because of this,
an important part of U.S. strategy in a global security system
dominated by the collapse of states would be finding effective
ways to limit the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by
violent sub-state organizations, to deter or preempt the use of
the weapons if such groups do acquire them, and to respond to
blackmail if deterrence or preemption fails.
Should the U.S. military be internally or externally
focused? In a global security system dominated by internal
disorder, the United States is likely to experience similar
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problems. While the total collapse of internal order in the
United States is unlikely, a range of challenges from urban
street gangs, high-tech extortionists, conspiracy-theory
terrorists, violent right-wing organizations to racial
separatists is at least conceivable. Under such conditions,
American leaders and the American public would have to decide
whether to return the military (particularly the Army) to its
historic mission of preserving internal order in regions where
police are incapable of doing so, or to keep the military focused
on defense against external enemies with only secondary
responsibility for internal order. If the internal challenge was
so great that the American people decided to use the military,
major changes would have to be made in law and attitudes, as well
as the organization and doctrine of the armed forces.
Internal Collapse: Military Implications.
In a security system dominated by internal disorder and the
collapse of state authority, there would be little sustained,
state-on-state war. States would use force to intervene in
neighbors and stem the spillover of disorder, but seldom against
each other. This would mean that the U.S. military would abandon
its conventional warfighting mission and focus instead on
internal order, counterterrorism, nation assistance, peace
support operations, and humanitarian relief. The Army could be
dominated by Special Forces with small, flexible units given
extensive training in languages and local politics and designed
to provide advice and training to allies. The revolution in
military affairs, which so far has focused on conventional stateon-state warfare, would be altered to produce more efficient and
effective means of operating in a low-intensity conflict
environment.55 A security system dominated by internal disorder
and the collapse of states would be one in which the U.S. Air
Force and the U.S. Navy would play a smaller role than in some of
the other future alternatives. Aerospace and naval power would be
used primarily for border patrols, anti-smuggling activities, and
prevention of illegal immigration, with some capacity for small
but long-range, precision strikes.
Alternative V: Economic Warfare.
A final plausible future security system is one
characterized by intense, sometimes violent competition between
nations and transnational entities for resources and markets.
This is similar to Edward Luttwak's concept of "geo-economics"
which mixes the traditional, adversarial, zero-sum, and
paradoxical logic of conflict with commerce's blend of
competition and cooperation.56 In such a system, there are two
possible military frameworks. In the first, states and
governments retain a near-monopoly on organized violence and the
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legitimate use of force, and continue to serve as agents of
commercial organizations. Actions which benefit corporations such
as protection of their overseas assets and freedom of navigation
would continue to be defined as national interests. A second
framework would be one in which transnational corporations either
have their own well-armed and sometimes large security forces, or
will hire specialized security companies or even governments
looking for ways to subvent their armed forces. Glimmers of this
exist already: in Africa, a corporation called Executive
Outcomes, composed largely of former South African commandos, has
been hired by a number of governments, and many former South
African spies are forming private intelligence- gathering
agencies.57 This could be the beginning of a trend.
In a system dominated by economic warfare, military force
structure, doctrine, and equipment would be designed to minimize
collateral damage when used. If the objective of military
operations is to acquire or defend resources and markets, the
goal would obviously be to do as little damage as possible to
infrastructure, plant, and equipment. Since casualties diminish
potential customers, nonlethal weaponry will play a major role in
military operations. The most important military missions would
be information warfare against competitors and protection of
informa- tional, physical, and human assets against violence and
extortion. Armed forces would range from very sophisticated and
technology-reliant ones which serve rich nations or transitional
entities to old-fashioned thugs serving lower-level or poorer
masters. (See Figure 5.)
Economic Warfare: Strategic Issues.
In a future security system where most conflict involves the
struggle for resources and markets, three strategic issues are
likely to be the most important for the United States.

What is the appropriate relationship between the state and
transnational corporations? In a future system where conflict
arises from the struggle for resources and markets, most major
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Figure 5. Economic Warfare.

corporations will be transnational. It will be difficult to
decide which transnational corporations are American and thus
warrant the use of U.S. power resources to protect or promote. At
the extreme, the whole concept of "national" security may become
irrelevant if corporations become truly transnational and
security is defined in economic terms. Deciding under what
conditions it is appropriate to use state resources to protect a
national corporation or cartel will be a vital strategic issue.
Similarly, in a system where corporations or cartels have
their own power that transcends the strictly economic, the United
States will have to decide what sort of relationship to have with
transnational corporations or multinational cartels. Should, for
instance, the United States consider signing treaties, perhaps
even nonaggression pacts with powerful corporations? And, if
corporations do appear to pose an actual challenge to the power
of the state, should the U.S. Government pursue a strategy
designed specifically to prevent the accumulation of non-economic
power by corporations? And, what should U.S. policy be toward
transnational security corporations (a.k.a. mercenaries) such as
the highly successful Executive Outcomes composed of former South
African soldiers? Clearly, if power continues to accrue to
transnational corporations, the United States will have to rethink some of the basic tenets of its approach to security and
world politics.

How can the United States help prevent economic competition
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from spilling over into political competition or conflict? In a
world where most conflict arises from the competition for
resources and markets, there will be the risk that struggles
between corporations could spark conflict between nations as
governments rush to support "their" commercial entities. There
are historic precedents for this. Conflict between European
trading and colonization companies in Asia, the Americas, and,
later, Africa sometimes caused European wars. In a future
security system with intense corporate competition and even
conflict, the United States would have to take deliberate steps
to build a firewall between commercial conflict and state
conflict. This would be very hard to do from a political
perspective since it might entail the government of the United
States rejecting an appeal for help from an American corporation.
What is the appropriate strategy for national information
security? If economic competition becomes the main source of
conflict in the future security system and if, as Toffler argues,
the United States develops a full-fledged "informa-tion economy,"
then protection of national information assets might become the
cornerstone of national security. Under these conditions,
crafting a strategy for national information security will be
extremely important. Such a strategy would have to develop broad
concepts for when, where, and how national power would be used to
protect information assets, and would have to be built on some
visions of the desired state of national and world information
assets. Already, some analysts are calling for such a strategy.58
The more that economics and national security meld in the future,
the greater the need for a coherent national information
strategy.
Economic Warfare: Military Implications.
There would be only limited need for a traditional
warfighting capability by the U.S. military in a security system
where conflict derives from economic competition. The U.S.
military would probably retain some capacity to deter states
still intent on waging traditional interstate war, but this would
not be the focus. Instead, the U.S. military would concentrate
more on information warfare and information security, with great
stress on nonlethal weapons. It is likely that the United States
would develop an information corps as suggested by Martin Libicki
and James A. Hazlett.59 This might go even further and see the
creation of an information security service that is either part
of or affiliated with the military. One of the great challenges
for the U.S. military would be to develop doctrine and techniques
for operating in coalition with non-state militaries such as
corporate armies or mercenary corporations. In general, though, a
future security system where economic competition is the main
source of conflict would probably see the smallest need for a
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robust, traditional-style U.S. military.
Conclusions.
All of the future systems described here are models or
heuristic devices intended to aid analysis and long-term
planning. The actual future security system will undoubtedly
include all types of conflict, and thus be a blend of systems.
This does not mean that all forms of conflict will be of equal
importance. American political leaders and national security
strategists must thus reach a consensus on the priority or
importance of the plausible forms of future conflict. Only when
this is done can the military effectively build a program for
long-term force development.
One significant fact emerges from any assessment of
alternative future security systems: traditional, interstate
warfighting is not an eternal function, but is system specific.
It is conceivable that the global security system in place by
2030 will not be one where interstate war is a significant form
of conflict. This would require an absolutely funda- mental
reorientation of the U.S. military. Of course, it is impossible
to predict exactly what direction such a reorientation will take.
Given that, there are three things that the U.S. military can and
should do now to prepare for whatever future comes to pass.
First, it should continue to explore information warfare,
casualty-minimizing techniques, and the impact that proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction will have on military operations.
These things will be significant in any future security
environment. Second, the U.S. military should continue to
reexamine fundamental concepts and stress flexibility of
organizational structure and doctrine. Third, the U.S. military
must continue to pursue futurism. Currently, several studies of
the long-term future have been done, each using a different
methodology. These include the Air Force's Alternative Futures
for 2025, and the Project 2025 of the National Defense
University.60 In any form of innovative thinking, the first step
is to generate new methodologies, approaches and ideas, and then
to reconcile them. Military futurism is in the first stage but
should soon move toward consensus (while always allowing room for
creative dissent). In any case, by pursuing these three
intellectual endeavors, the military can generate the conceptual
raw material to make necessary changes once the future security
system finally crystallizes.
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